INTRODUCTION
In 1966 the United States Supreme Court under Chief Justice Warren issued the Miranda v. Arzona' ruling. In 1971 the "new" Supreme Court under Chief Justice Burger issued the first in a series of rulings which chipped away at Miranda .2 Since then many commentators have speculated about the future of Miranda and have concluded that the future looks dim. 3 Even the more cautious legal journals have reached similar conclusions. 4 Some have predicted that the Burger Court will continue to undermine the substance of the decision, though perhaps not actually overrule it,5 while another has predicted that the Court "will assuredly overrule it within the near future." '6 The purpose of this article is not to analyze the rulings and add another prediction to the list but to examine systematically the reaction of state supreme courts to the rulings in order to determine whether these courts have eroded the Miranda principles by failing to require strict adherence to them. It is assumed that the state supreme court judges, like the commentators, saw the apparent handwriting on the 14 367 U.S. 643 (1961) . 15 378 U. S. 478 (1964) . 16 387 U.S. 1 (1967 Analysis, 27 W. POLITICAL Q. 38 (1974) . For Gault-Lefstein, Stapleton, & Teitelbaum, In Search ofJuvenilejustice: Gault and its Implementation, 3 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 491 (1969) .
18 Here "noncompliance" is used generally to mean a failure to follow the Supreme Court's doctrine in similar, related cases. In the studies cited the term was operationalized specifically to categorize reactions to whatever doctrine was involved.
19 Romans, supra, note 17. 20 Id at 42-51. 21 Id at 51-52, 58. In fact, one researcher interested in the comparative impact of clear and ambiguous decisions called Miranda "exceedingly clear." L. BERKSON, THE SUPREME COURT AND ITS PUBLICS: THE COMMUNICATION OF POLICY DECISIONS 47 (1978) .
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confessions. As such, it signaled the Court's intention to make policy in this area and, correspondingly, it warned the lower courts not to try to evade it.22 From this research on the impact of judicial decisions upon the lower courts, some conclusions and implications emerge. Lower courts often do not faithfully comply with the Supreme Court's doctrine. This has been especially true for its doctrine concerning criminal rights. The Court must establish clear doctrine and indicate its determination to get the lower courts to comply by issuing a series of decisions reinforcing its doctrine. Once the Court no longer indicates its determination to enforce a doctrine, the lower courts will sense less. pressure from the Court to comply with it. Further, if the Court not only stops indicating its determination to enforce a doctrine, but actually exhibits an intention to erode it, the lower courts might erode the doctrine faster than the Court does by itself. Hence two hypotheses emerge: the lower courts eroded the Miranda doctrine and, in fact, eroded it further than the Burger Court itself already had done.
This article will evaluate these hypotheses by first discussing Miranda and the Burger Court's post-iranda rulings and then comparing these rulings with state supreme court holdings in related cases.
II. MZRdND4 AND THE BURGER COURT'S POST-MR4NDA RULINGS
Prior to 1964 courts generally used the "voluntariness" test to determine whether confessions could be admitted as evidence at trial. This test asked, simply, whether the confessions were voluntary, given the totality of the circumstances involved. Obviously, this test was highly subjective. 23 In 1964, the Court moved away from the voluntariness test by proposing objective criteria to determine whether confessions could be admitted. In Escobedo v. Illinois, it held that police must inform suspects, before interrogation, that they have the right to remain silent. Also, it held that police must allow suspects to consult with their attorney. Otherwise, the confessions would be presumed to have been coerced. 24 In 1966, the Miranda Court reaffirmed Escobedo and elaborated upon it. The Court held that police must inform suspects that they have the right to remain silent, that anything they say may be used against them, that they have the right to an attorney, and that if they cannot afford an attorney the court will appoint one for them. The Court stipulated that suspects may waive these rights if they do so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, but that they may also reassert these rights at any later time.
In Justice Rehnquist said the police acted in good faith, by following the Escobedo requirements in effect at the time of the interrogation, and actually followed all but one of the Miranda requirements. The police had failed to advise the suspect that if he could not afford an attorney the court would appoint one for him. The Warren Court stressed that this is a critical component of the warnings. 3 1 But Rehnquist concluded that 25 "[S]tatements merely intended to be exculpatory by the defendant are often used to impeach his testimony at trial.. . . These statements are incriminating in any meaningful sense of the word and may not be used without the full warnings and effective waiver required for any other statement." 384 U.S. at 477.
26 "Some comments in the Miranda opinion can indeed be read as indicating a bar to use of an uncounseled statement for any purpose, but discussion of that issue was not at all necessary to the Court's holding and cannot be regarded as controlling." Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. at 224.
27 One commentator notes, "[r]ightly or wrongly, Miranda was deliberately structured to canvass a wide range of problems, many of which were not directly raised by the cases before the Court. This approach was thought necessary in order to 'give concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow.' 384 U.S. at 441-42. Thus, a technical reading of Miranda, such as that employed in Harrir, would enable the Court to label many critical aspects of the decision mere dictum and therefore not 'controlling.'" Stone, supra note 4, at 107-08. Nevertheless, the Court has not used this means of undercut- In conclusion, the Burger Court's rulings primarily served to weaken Miranda, though at the same time they exhibited a reluctance to weaken Miranda as much as they might have. As Israel observed, "the fact remains that Miranda still is the law of the land. Moreover, while its ramifications arguably have been narrowed, the Court has not cast doubt upon its basic premise that the defendant's right against self-incrimination applies to police custodial interrogation . . . -49 In short, the Court has become less strict in requiring adherence to its doctrine, but has altered its doctrine in only one respect-allowing prosecutors to 42 Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976 174 (1977) . 45 To underscore this, Stone notes that in the four years before 1978 the Court granted certiorari in only one of the 35 cases on its appellate docket in which defendants sought review due to alleged violations of Miranda, while the Court granted certiorari in 13 of the 25 cases in which governments sought review. Stone, supra note 4, at 100.
46 422 U.S. 171 (1975) . S. 610 (1976) . 48 Id at 617-19. 49 Israel, supra note 4, at 1374. In this context another ruling deserves mention. In Brewer v. Williams, 430 U. S. 387 (1977) , the Court held that statements obtained after a former mental patient had been arrested and given Miranda warnings were inadmissible, because the former patient had been interrogated subtly without his counsel being present. The Court rejected a request from 22 state attorneys general that it overrule Miranda; instead, it decided the case on the basis of the sixth amendment.
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use illegally obtained statements to impeach defendants' credibility.5°I II. STATE SUPREME COURTS' RULINGS State supreme courts readily invalidated blatant violations of Miranda.5 1 However, the Burger Court's post-Miranda rulings concerned less blatant violations of Miranda. From these rulings four issues continually arose before the state supreme courts: Could prosecutors use illegally obtained statements to impeach defendants' credibility? Could prosecutors use the fact that defendants were silent during interrogation to impeach their credibility? Could prosecutors use statements made when police gave suspects incorrect warnings? Could prosecutors use statements made when police refused to stop interrogation after suspects asked them to, or statements made when police agreed to stop but later resumed interrogation?
All relevant state supreme court cases decided after Haris were included in the study. 52 Cases were deemed not relevant if they revolved around the factual determination of whether suspects voluntarily waived their rights. Of course, purported "factual determinations" can camouflage a tendency to evade the Miranda guidelines. 53 Even genuine factual determinations which conclude that suspects' rights were violated also can conclude that the violations were "harmless errors" and not reversible. 54 But without the record, it is impossible to assess the courts' decisions, so these cases cannot be included.
50 Nevertheless, the Court probably has confused some lower court judges about the continuing validity of its doctrine. Consequently, it seems inappropriate to use "compliancenoncompliance" terminology in evaluating lower court decisions. Such terminology presumes that compliance can be ascertained clearly. 57 Since Harri, however, this tendency has been reversed.
Of the twenty-seven state supreme courts which addressed the issue, twenty-one fully embraced Hams. 58 Typical of these was the Arkansas court, which quoted Chief Justice Burger's opinion approvingly: "'The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense. . . .' "59 Less typical were the Colorado and Florida courts, which overruled their own precedents in order to conform to Harris. Both criticized the ruling. One observed that it contradicted the "plain English" of Miranda. 6 0 The other observed that it allowed jurors to use statements to assess credibility which were forbidden to be used in determining guilt. The court questioned whether jurors could be this discriminating and disciplined. 
Of the six remaining state supreme courts which addressed the issue, four neither fully embraced Har nor completely rejected it. The New Jersey and Maryland courts accepted it in principle but limited it in practice. The New Jersey court had to confront the sort of abuse which critics of the ruling predicted would flow from it. The court overruled a judge who instructed jurors to feel free to use illegally obtained statements in determining guilt, since they could not separate, in their own minds, using illegally obtained statements to assess credibility from using the statements to determine guilt. 62 The court also admonished a prosecutor who tried to use statements to impeach a defendant's credibility despite the fact that the defendant never testified. 63 The Maryland court held more broadly that prosecutors should not use illegally obtained statements even when defendants do testify unless the defendants themselves raise the subject of their prior statements. 64 The Oregon and Pennsylvania courts, unlike the New Jersey and Maryland courts, did not accept the ruling in principle, but they did not reject it in principle either. They distinguished Harris from cases before them.
65
Of all the state supreme courts which addressed the issue, only two completely rejected Harris. 66 The Hawaii court was the first, 67 followed by the California court, which initially adopted Haiis 68 but two years later rejected it. State v. Miller, 67 N.J. 229, 337 A.2d 36 (1975) . 63 State v. Davis, 67 N.J. 222, 337 A.2d 33 (1975) . But for an earlier decision accepting Harrir in principle, see State v. Falco, 60 N.J. 570, 292 A.2d 13 (1972) . 64 State v. Kidd, 281 Md. 32, 375 A.2d 1105 State v. Franklin, 281 Md. 51, 375 A.2d 1116 . 65 State v. Haas, 267 Or. 489, 517 P.2d 671 (1973) . The court said Harris did not apply because Harris was not given proper warnings, while Haas was, but was not provided with an attorney. Commonwealth v. Woods, 455 Pa. 1,312 A.2d 357 (1973) , cert. denied, 419 U.S. 880 (1974) ; Commonwealth v. Triplett, 462 Pa. 244, 341 A.2d 62 (1975) . 66 The courts were free to reject Harris, because the Burger Court has allowed them to impose stricter standards upon police and prosecutors than it has required them to impose. In fact, Justice Brennan encouraged them to impose stricter standards. In Mosl he said that "no State is precluded by the decision from adhering to higher standards under state law. 
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JOHN GRUHL stitutional provisions similar to the fifth amendment's right against compulsory self-incrimination.
The state supreme court's cases are compiled in Table 1 . As can be seen, the courts permitted prosecutors to use illegally obtained statements to impeach defendants' credibility in thirty-five of the forty-three cases they decided. In Miranda the Warren Court stated that prosecutors should not point to defendants' silence at interrogation. 7 1 But in Harris the Burger Court opened the door, perhaps unwittingly, to use of this tactic. Presumably, the Harris ruling applied only when police violated Miranda and, as a result, defendants made inculpatory statements. The Harris Court held that prosecutors could use these statements to impeach defendants' credibility. But the ruling could have been interpreted more broadly to signal the Court's intention to allow prosecutors greater leeway whenever they sought to impeach defendants' credibility. This interpretation raised the possibility that the Court would decide that prosecutors also could use the fact that defendants were silent at interrogation, in order to impeach their credibility. This tactic might be used if defendants testified and proceeded to give an alibi which they had not given police at arrest or interrogation. Prosecutors could then ask why they were silent when it would have been normal for them to give an alibi if they really had one. This tactic, of course, would penalize defendants for exercising their Miranda-guaranteed right to silence. It would discourage them from testifying, or, if they did testify, it would the basis of Mranda or a state constitutional provision, so its decision is not included in the numerical tally. Whiddon v. State, 492 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. Crim. App., 1973) .
71 "In accord with our decision today, it is impermissible to penalize an individual for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege when he is under police custodial interrogation. The prosecution may not, therefore, use at trial the fact that he stood mute or claimed his privilege in the face of accusation." 384 U.S. at 468 n.37.
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In the meantime there was considerable confusion in the state supreme courts. 72 Before Hale fourteen courts had decided cases involving such prosecutorial conduct. The Kansas and New York courts permitted it. 3 Justifying its decision, the New York court stated that Hamri¢ "modified" the scope of Miranda. 74 The Arizona court, in four cases in 1971 and 1972, also permitted it. 75 The court cited Hari. and declared, "We are still of the opinion that a defendant who takes the stand waives his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination .... *76 But the court in 1973 reversed itself. 77 The Alaska and Ohio courts permitted it when the defense first mentioned the defendants' silence, but they indicated they probably would not do so otherwise. 78 The nine remaining state supreme courts prohibited the prosecutorial conduct. The Pennsylvania court asserted sharply that Hamis did not apply; 79 The state supreme courts' cases are tallied in Table 2 . For the entire period between Harris and Doyle the courts permitted prosecutors to use defendants' silence to impeach their credibility in eleven of the fortyfour cases they decided, with most of these eleven coming before Hale. (Wyo. 1977) . The Hawaii and Washington courts did permit prosecutors to use defendants' silence to impeach their testimony if the defendants claimed they were not silent. The Burger Court did approve this. In Doyle it said, "It goes almost without saying that the fact of post-arrest silence could be used by the prosecution to contradict a defendant who testifies to an exculpatory version of events and claims to have told police the same version upon arrest. In that situation the fact of earlier silence would not be used to impeach the exculpatory story, but rather to challenge the defendant's testimony as to his behavior following arrest." 426 U.S. at 619-20 n. 11. The Michigan court, in its two cases before Hale, also permitted this. People v. Graham, 386 Mich. at 192 (1975) . For a contrary decision, see Bennett v. State, 231 Ga. 458, 202 S.E.2d 99 (1973) . But the Georgia court reversed itself after Doyle. Howard v. State, 237 Ga. 471, 228 S.E.2d 860 (1976) . Tucker the Burger Court showed that it might not require adherence to these precise warnings. It allowed a prosecutor to use statements which police obtained from a suspect after they gave him incorrect warnings. They failed to tell him that if he could not afford an attorney the court would appoint one for him, and the suspect, without benefit of an attorney, made inculpatory statements. The Court said that since the interrogation was before Miranda the police could not be expected to have complied with Miranda. In addition, the Court said the police nearly complied with Miranda anyway. The Court did not stipulate which of these two factors was controlling. 90 If the first was, the ruling would have little application; few cases after Tucker would involve interrogations before Miranda.' But if the second was controlling, the ruling would have considerable application; many cases would involve at least minor errors by police when they gave the warnings. Because the Court did not stipulate, it provided lower courts the opportunity to interpret it as they wished.
In numerous cases state supreme courts were confronted with complaints that police did not give correct warnings. The complaints fell into two categories: (1) police did not inform suspects of all their rights, omitting, usually, the notification that if they were too poor to afford an 88 Romans, supra note 17, at 51-52. 89 Id at 58. 90 Justice Rehnquist did say it was "significant" that the interrogation was before Miranda, but this was as close as he came to indicating which factor was controlling. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 447. attorney the court would appoint one for them; and (2) police informed suspects of all their rights but informed them with confusing statements.
1
When police did not inform suspects of all their rights, state supreme courts usually reversed the convictions. They reversed them in thirteen of the sixteen cases they decided. Before Tucker they typically said the warnings were hollow if they did not include the notification that the court would appoint an attorney.
92 Even in three cases in which suspects had been interrogated prior to Miranda, as Tucker had been, the courts concluded that the omission was fatal. 93 The only courts which did not reverse the convictions were those presented with unusual facts. In one case the suspect had been given correct warnings three times before the incorrect warning, 94 and in another the suspect could afford an attorney and already had retained one. 95 After Tucker, as well, the courts usually reversed the convictions. The Colorado court reversed despite the fact that the suspect had an attorney, though not during interrogation.
96
The Pennsylvania court reversed despite the fact that the suspect had been interrogated prior to Miranda .97 Following an earlier decision in the case, the state appealed, and the Burger Court, in the aftermath of Tucker, remanded the decision. 98 But the Pennsylvania high court refused to change it. The court asserted that Tucker was irrelevant, because it dealt with the fruits of an admission rather than with the admission itself, as here. Also, to be safe, the court based its decision, in part, on the Pennsylvania Constitution. In contrast, the Florida court did not reverse the conviction appealed to it.
99
The case did not concern an interrogation prior to Miranda, so the court easily could have distinguished it from Tucker. Yet the court chose not to do so. Ignoring this salient difference between the two cases, the People v. Costa, 193 Colo. 386, 566 P.2d 366 (1977) . 97 Commonwealth v. Romberger, 464 Pa. 488, 347 A.2d 460 (1975) . [Vol. 72
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court quoted Tucker's remark that Miranda was not meant "'to create a constitutional strait jacket.' "100 The court said the warnings were correct enough. Thus, the court showed how a lower court can interpret an ambiguous ruling so as to weaken constitutional rights perhaps more than the upper court had intended. When police informed suspects of all their rights but informed them with confusing statements, state supreme courts were less willing to reverse the convictions. This was true before Tucker as well as after. The courts reversed the convictions in just twelve of the thirty-five cases they decided. In some of the cases, the complaints alleged that police did not convey clearly the right to appointed counsel. For example, police gave the following warning: "If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer and want one, we will see that you have a lawyer provided to you before we ask you any questions." Appellants claimed this warning did not indicate that the lawyer would be free, but they could not convince the courts. 10 1 In other cases the complaints alleged that police did not convey clearly the right to appointed counsel for interrogation, as well as for trial. For example, police gave the following warning: "You have the right to the advice and presence of a lawyer even if you cannot afford to hire one. We have no way of giving you a lawyer, but one will be appointed for you, if you wish, if and when you go to court. If you wish to answer questions now without a lawyer present, you have the right to stop answering questions at any time." While two courts ruled this inadequate, 10 2 six ruled it sufficiently clear. 103 Police gave similar warnings which appellants claimed did not convey the right to counsel for interrogation, but courts generally were not sympathetic.
1 04 The Wis-consin court epitomized such decisions when it admitted that the warnings were not "a model of clarity" but noted that they did include all the rights. 10 5 Some courts found support in Tucker for their decisions.' 0 6
The Florida court said Tucker recognized the difference between "a violation of the defendants' substantive consitutional rights" and "an inadvertent violation of the procedural safeguards designed to protect those rights." 10 7 In still other cases the complaints alleged that police did not convey clearly the warning that anything the suspects said could be used against them. These complaints arose when some police warned suspects that anything they said could be used "for or against" them. Obviously nothing they said would be used "for" them, so the warning was misleading. One court found that it violated Miranda,108 but three others thought the error was too minor to constitute a violation. 10 9 Again, the Wisconsin court said this misleading warning was not major enough to invalidate a confession automatically, but that giving it is "a practice that should not be encouraged, and in some circumstances could result in the vitiation of an otherwise antiseptic confession." ' 110 The courts' rulings in these cases are displayed in Table 3 . As shown, the courts excused the police's errors in twenty-six of the fiftyone cases. Also, as shown, the courts did not rule much differently after Tucker than they did before it.
REFUSING TO STOP INTERROGATION, RESUMING INTERROGATION
In Miranda, the Warren Court made clear that suspects undergoing interrogation can exercise their rights to silence or an attorney and request police to stop the interrogation at any time.I' The Court empha-105 Jones v. State, 69 Wis. 2d 337, 342, 230 N.W.2d 677, 681 (1975) .
106 See, e.g., State v. Statewright, 300 So. 2d 674, 677-78 (Fla. 1974); State v. Davis, 336 So. 2d 805, 808 (La. 1976) .
107 State v. Statewright, 300 So. 2d at 677. 108 Commonwealth v. Camm, 443 Pa. 253, 277 A.2d 325 (1971 ), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1046 ; Commonwealth v. Nathan, 445 Pa. 470, 285 A.2d 175 (1971) .
109 State v. Melvin, 65 N.J. 1, 319 A.2d 450 (1974); State v. Vidal, 82 Wash. 2d 74, 508 P.2d 158 (1974); Madkins v. State, 50 Wis. 2d 347, 184 N.W.2d 144 (1971); McClellan v. State, 53 Wis. 2d 724, 193 N.W.2d 711 (1972) .
11O Id at 730, 193 N.W.2d at 715. Occasionally cases arose in which appellants claimed that police violated Miranda by failing to warn them that if they waived their rights and began answering questions, they could assert their rights anytime later and stop answering questions. The Warren Court said, "[olnce warnings have been given the subsequent procedure is clear. If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease." 384 U.S. at 473-74. State supreme courts agreed that these are "guidelines for police conduct, not additional elements of the required warning." Miller v. State, 263 Ind. 595, 597, 335 N.E.2d 206, 208 (1975) .
I11 "If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning." 384 U.S. at 444-45.
STATE POST-MIRANDA RULINGS
sized that suspects' requests must be "scrupulously honored." 112 But in Mosley the Burger Court permitted a prosecutor to use statements obtained after police acceded to a suspect's request to stop but then resumed the interrogation two hours later. In Miranda, the Warren Court did not consider this kind of situation. Therefore, Mosly can be viewed as refining Miranda or, if that precedent is read more literally, weakening it. The Burger Court insisted that Mos/ey be viewed as the former.'
13
Yet there is a fine line between refusing to stop and agreeing to stop but resuming again. In related cases state supreme courts decided whether police must honor suspects' requests to stop. These cases fell into four categories: (1) suspects requested silence, but police refused to stop; (2) suspects requested an attorney, but police refused to stop for them to get one; (3) suspects requested silence, and police agreed to stop but resumed again; and (4) suspects requested an attorney, and police agreed to stop but resumed again before the suspects got one.
When suspects requested silence but police refused to stop, state supreme courts held the resulting statements inadmissible in ten of the twelve cases they heard. They held the statements inadmissible whether police ignored repeated requests to halt' 1 4 or, after the initial request, When suspects requested an attorney but police refused to stop for them to get one, state supreme courts did not rule quite as consistently. They held the statements inadmissible in eighteen of the twenty-seven cases they heard. While they held them inadmissible in nearly all cases in which police ignored repeated requests to halt, 119 or even a single clear request, 120 they did not always hold them inadmissible when the requests were not repeated or clear. According to Miranda, the clarity or number of requests should not have mattered, for the ruling mandates police to cease immediately if suspects indicate "in any manner" that they want the police to cease.
12 1 For a few courts these factors did not matter. 122 The California court said the requests did not need to be unmistakably clear. 123 But for other courts they did matter. Although suspects indicated in at least some manner that they wanted police to cease until they got an attorney, the police either sought to discourage them, 124 or they simply continued to question them, 1 25 and the courts excused the officers' conduct. When suspects requested silence and police agreed to stop but resumed again, the courts did not side with the appellants as often as they did when police refused to stop. In fact, they rarely sided with the appellants. They held the statements inadmissible in just two of the eleven cases they heard. In both cases the police resumed shortly after stopping.1 26 However, in other cases the police resumed fifteen minutes after stopping 27 or twenty to thirty minutes after stopping, 128 and the courts did not hold the statements inadmissible. The decisions seemed to mock the suspects' requests that interrogation cease, but the courts said that they considered factors besides the length of time between stopping and resuming. These factors included a change in locations, in the officers conducting the interrogation, or in the charges to be filed against the suspect. 1 29 It is not apparent why a change in locations or in the officers conducting the interrogation would justify renewed questioning, but consideration of these factors meant that the balance almost always weighed against the appellants. 1 30 In response to an appellant's claim that any resumption narrowed Miranda, the Colorado court justified its decision by stating that "a periodic repeating of the procedure until the accused finally makes a statement would not be permitted." 1 3 '
When suspects requested an attorney and police agreed to stop but resumed again before the suspects got one, the courts issued rulings which did not show any pattern. They held the statements inadmissible in six of the thirteen cases they decided. Thus, they did side with the appellants more often than they did when the appellants requested silence and police resumed. Perhaps this was due to the unequivocal sentence in Miranda: "If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. The cases are broken down in Table 4 . As shown, the courts allowed the police conduct in twenty-eight of the sixty-three cases. Also, as shown, the number of cases in which they allowed the conduct did not increase after Mosley. while the western and eastern courts were least prone to do so. Presumably, the greater political conservatism of the South and Midwest extended to judicial acceptance of the Miranda principles. 142 Of the three models used to characterize the relationship between the Supreme Court and the lower courts, the bureaucratic model, where the Supreme Court establishes policy and the lower courts impose bureaucratic restraints, is the most useful in explaining the relationship as 142 Dolbeare and Hammond found remarkably similar regional differences in their study of school district compliance with the Court's school prayer decisions. The southern and midwestern school districts complied least, while the eastern and western districts complied most. K. DOLBEARE State Supreme Courts, 1870 -1970 , 30 STAN. L. REv. 121 (1977 . Though this variable is intriguing as an explanation for differences in state supreme court decision-making, it does not explain the differences in this research. This could be due to the small number of cases individual courts decided, or it could be due to other, unknown factors. it affects the Miranda policy. The Supreme Court under Chief Justice Warren established the policy, and the Court under Chief Justice Burger maintained the policy, with one significant exception. 143 Moreover, the Court persuaded the state supreme courts to implement the policy. Previous research found that the state supreme courts generally enforced the Miranda requirements as early as 1968,144 and this research found that the state supreme courts generally enforced the requirements throughout the 1970s.1 4 5 Nevertheless, the courts did not implement the policy automatically. They eroded it in certain types of cases. Naturally, they eroded it in cases in which prosecutors used illegally obtained statements to impeach defendants' credibility, but they eroded it here in response to the Burger Court's single change in the Miranda policy. However, they eroded it in other cases as well.
In addition, the bureaucratic model is the most useful in explaining the relationship between the Supreme Court and state supreme courts because the model suggests that Court policy which is clear is more likely to be implemented than policy which is not clear. While Miranda was clear, the Burger Court's rulings which weakened Miranda, with one exception, were not particularly clear. Consequently, they did not result in as much erosion of the Miranda principles by state supreme courts as observers seemed to expect. Instead, these courts often refused to alter their liberal policies regarding confessions, even though the Burger Court's rulings were unquestionably conservative in direction. Correspondingly, the Burger Court's ruling that was the one exception and was clear-Harnr---did result in considerable erosion. Thus, the role of clarity, as seen in the relationship between Escobedo and Miranda, also can be seen in the relationship between Miranda and the Burger Court's rulings.
The role of clarity can be illustrated more specifically by noting a pair of distinctions drawn by many of the courts. The courts did not excuse police when they gave incomplete warnings but did excuse police when they gave confusing warnings; and the courts did not excuse police when they refused to cease interrogation after suspects had asked them to cease but did excuse police when they resumed interrogation after they agreed to cease. The first practice of each of these distinctions is explicitly prohibited by Miranda, while the second of each is prohibited 143 The exception is permitting prosecutors to use illegally obtained statements to impeach defendants' credibility.
144 Romans, supra note 17, at 52-53. 145 It is worth noting that the courts' opinions seem to reflect the expectation that Miranda will continue to remain in effect. The opinions do not predict the ruling's demise, unlike the commentators' remarks. Further, the opinions do not criticize the ruling often. In fact, they criticize the ruling less often than they do the Burger Court's decisions which chipped away at it.
